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In 2014 the issue of constitutional change in the UK brought about by an agreement 
between the UK and Scottish Government, for a referendum on Scottish 
independence, created the motivation for widespread political engagement with the 
formal political process. Scottish citizens – including newly enfranchised 16 and 17 
year olds – were debating, discussing and disagreeing about opting out of one of the 
world’s richest countries. This was an unusual situation and one that nearly 
happened despite a hostile corporate, political and mainstream media response to the 
demand for independence. It would be a mistake, however, to assume that this 
movement for change was the result of narrow-minded nationalism. Although the 
Referendum result was that Scotland should remain in the UK the process also 
produced widespread politicization of ordinary people. The cultural politics of 
communities had engaged with the political culture of the state and the dialectic 
between the two generated educational experiences and opened up new political 
possibilities. 
Keywords: Scottish referendum, independence, politicization, counter-hegemonic 
change 
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Durante el 2014 la propuesta de cambio constitucional en el Reino Unido, surgida 
por un acuerdo entre los gobiernos de Londres y de Edimburgo para la realización 
de un referéndum sobre la independencia de Escocia, motivó e hizo aumentar el 
compromiso político. Los ciudadanos de Escocia – incluyendo con derecho a voto a 
las personas 16 y 17 años de edad - estuvieron debatiendo, discutiendo y 
divergiendo sobre la necesidad de salir voluntariamente o no, de uno de los países 
más ricos del mundo. Una situación inusual, que se dio a pesar de la respuesta hostil 
de los medios oficiales y políticos a la demanda de independencia. Siendo un error 
calificar este movimiento de cambio como el resultado de un nacionalismo cerrado. 
Aunque el resultado del referéndum fue que Escocia permaneciera en el Reino 
Unido, el proceso también produjo la politización generalizada de la gente corriente. 
La cultura política de la comunidad se había comprometido con la cultura política 
del estado, de la dialéctica entre ambas se ha generado una experiencia educativa 
que ha abierto nuevas posibilidades políticas. 
Palabras clave: referéndum escocés, independencia, politización, cambio contra-
hegemónico
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wo days after the referendum vote on independence, on September 
18
th
 2014, an unusual scene occurred in Glasgow’s George Square, 
a central point in Scotland’s largest city which had been a rallying 
place for pro-independence campaigners. The result of the vote was a 
majority of 55% for staying in the UK and 45% for independence. The 
following day, George Square was occupied by far right unionist groups 
who came to taunt independence campaigners, an unusual scene because the 
campaign itself was marked more by its civility rather than overt 
antagonisms. It was another incident, however, that can be seen as a defining 
moment in the sense of embodying the central motif of the campaign. 
Several days after the above incident, people began to arrive in George 
Square and bring with them food parcels which were being collected for the 
poor and homeless. This was not the normal venue for such acts of charity. 
The growth of food banks
1 
in the UK has accelerated under the UK 
government’s welfare and austerity policies. What seemed so poignant about 
the food bank donations was that it symbolised a visible and public act of 
coming together. If we understand politics as meaning how we collectively 
decide on the distribution of goods and resources in society these donations 
were more than mere gestures of charity.  The need to act collectively, both 
in and outside mainstream political parties, is a legacy of the referendum 
process which, in the long-term, may have much greater implications than 
the referendum outcome itself. It is the reassertion of politics in people’s 
lives which is the focus of this article because this is the important story that 
is unfolding and has widespread implications. 
 
The Referendum in Context 
 
In October 2010 the UK Government agreed that the Scottish Government, 
led by the Scottish National Party (SNP), could host a referendum on 
independence on the condition that there was a single unambiguous question 
with a yes or no answer. The question put was “Should Scotland be an 
independent country?” The initial position of the Scottish Government was 
that there should be another ballot option which is referred to as “devolution 
max” (or ‘devo max’), that is, the maximum amount of devolved control to 
the Scottish Government as possible but remaining within the UK union. 
T 
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“Devo max” is popularly understood as a further stepping stone on the road 
to independence through control over all internal matters to do with Scotland 
along with maintaining the Crown, the UK currency and aspects of 
international trade and security arrangements (but excluding nuclear missiles 
on Scottish land). In negotiations on the proposed referendum question with 
the UK Government the “devo max” option was traded for the Scottish 
Government having the right to set the date of the vote and to include 16 and 
17 year olds as first time voters. The two-year run in to the referendum 
created the possibility of plenty of opportunities for debate and discussion 
across the nation. This time period was critical to the educative nature of the 
campaign. 
We have to go further back in modern history to make sense of this 
situation and why the UK Government agreed to the referendum. The UK 
comprises England, Wales, Northern Ireland, Scotland and their 
constitutional relationship has been shaped by internal political dynamics, 
within the different constituent parts, from the 1970s onwards. For example, 
in Northern Ireland the history of the troubles and military conflicts, which 
had grown markedly in the 1970s, resulted in a form of devolved 
government based on power sharing between the warring communities. On 
the other hand, a Welsh National Assembly was set up in the late 1990s with 
limited legislative powers than was either the case in Northern Ireland or 
Scotland. In Wales the demand for a degree of ‘home rule’ had a strong 
cultural dimension rather than popular support for economic and political 
autonomy. The case for devolution in Scotland had been a recurring theme 
in Scottish modern political history and in the 1990s a broad coalition of 
political and civic groups campaigned for a new Scottish constitutional 
settlement. The backing of the main political force in Scotland, during this 
period the Scottish Labour Party, along with Labour in power in the UK 
Parliament, assured legislation for a devolved institution. In 1997, the 
Scottish referendum on devolution backed the establishment of a new 
Parliament with 75% majority in favour (see Crowther, Martin and Shaw 
2003) The SNP had, however, only tacitly supported this campaign because 
its priority was something greater – Scottish independence.  
As things turned out the SNP became the main political beneficiaries of 
devolution. New Labour in Scotland, which formed the first and subsequent 
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coalition governments with the Scottish Liberal Democrats, massively 
underwhelmed the electorate with lacklustre performances. In Scottish 
Parliamentary elections the Labour vote shrunk, from 34% in 1999 to 26% 
in 2011. In local elections the same pattern of decline was witnessed (see 
Davidson 2014). As Labour’s political fortunes waned the SNP’s rose. This 
was particularly the case after the Iraq war in 2004 and Labour’s increasing 
adherence to neoliberal policies in the UK. In 2007 the Scottish national 
elections resulted in the formation of a minority SNP Government; its very 
first time in office. Its position of support for the National Health Service 
and free medical prescriptions, its opposition to tuition fees for higher 
education, along with its resistance to water privatisation as well as 
upholding the principle of free care for the elderly, enabled the SNP to 
position itself as the defender of social democratic values, previously the 
policy turf of the Labour Party.  
Although the SNP’s raison d’être was independence, it had also 
developed a credible range of social and economic policies which provided 
it with electoral support. Along with its broadly social democratic social 
policy, however, the SNP developed a more neoliberal business friendly 
economic policy, such as support for cutting corporation tax. Also indicative 
of this approach was the active support given by the SNP leader to the 
American millionaire, Donald Trump, despite the fact that he was riding 
roughshod over local communities with new golf course schemes that local 
communities had rejected. Nevertheless, in 2011 the SNP achieved an 
outright electoral victory – an outcome which under the proportional system 
of representation had been regarded as impossible to achieve - by winning 
69 parliamentary seats out of 129 in the Scottish Parliament. Most of its 
success was achieved at the expense of the Labour Party which 
haemorrhaged seats in their former industrial heartlands. The political scene 
was set for the SNP to pursue what had been central to its political existence: 
independence from the UK. 
Whilst support for the SNP had grown in Scottish politics the electorate 
still voted mainly for Labour in UK national elections. The appetite for 
devolution was clear; the appetite for Scottish independence was less 
obvious, with opinion polls indicating that only around 30% of the electorate 
found it appealing. However an official referendum on constitutional change 
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did require the agreement of the UK government. This was forthcoming 
primarily because the Westminster government calculated the referendum 
would be an act of political self-immolation by the SNP. According to 
Davidson, the UK Prime Minister’s motive was simple enough: 
 
He wanted to see the decisive defeat of the independence option, if not 
for all time, then at least for the foreseeable future, whilst 
simultaneously denying Salmond [The SNP leader] the easy victory of 
Devo Max. The risks involved seemed small – polls consistently 
showed minority support for independence…” (2014, p3) 
 
To add spice to the situation, electoral defeat on the issue would 
undermine the SNP in the future – denied its core purpose its options would 
be to return to the political wilderness from whence it came in the 1930s or 
to jettison independence. However the plan did not work out like this; today 
the apparent victors of the referendum campaign (e.g. Labour Party) have 
the appearance of losers as their support in Scotland spirals downwards. On 
the other hand, the main political parties for independence (the SNP, The 
Scottish Greens and the Scottish Socialist Party) are witnessing a surge in 
party membership levels and electoral support.  
Something has happened in Scottish society which is potentially much 
more significant than the referendum result. The electorate have been 
actively politicised in a totally unforeseen way and it is this legacy of the 
campaign that is the focus of this article.  
Over the campaign period there were numerous points of difference 
between the opponents and proponents of independence, which were the 
focus of deliberation, disagreement, discussion, debate and reflection. To 
simplify the fault lines at stake, and to provide insight into the differences 
between the opposing factions, it is useful to look at what independence 
meant for them. It is important to address this because the meaning of 
independence, and the related issue of nationalism, was central to the 
credibility of the different arguments made by both camps. Furthermore, for 
a wider audience beyond the UK, interested in social justice, the politics of 
nationalism has negative connotations, particularly in the light of 
contemporary political history in Europe and Africa, in that it conjures up 
barbaric acts of ethnic cleansing and ‘blood and soil’ versions of nationalism 
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that have more to do with social injustice than social justice. So the 
meanings of nationalism in the campaign needs to be clarified and assessed. 
 
Nationalisms and the Independence Referendum 
 
There were at least two versions of nationalism in the independence 
referendum, depending on what we mean by this term (see Heywood 2012). 
If nationalism is taken to mean the principle of the nation being valued as the 
central unit of political organisation of a country, or territory, there were two 
versions of nationalism: the UK and the Scottish versions. Although they 
differed significantly, what they had in common was characteristic of 
nationalism as an alignment between the state and its territories which 
suppresses internal distinctions within its borders, for example, differences 
of social class. However, like most important concepts nationalism is 
contested and there are other meanings which have their roots in anti-
colonial and postcolonial history, which fuse national self-determination 
with radical claims for social and political liberation. If we understand 
nationalism in these terms then there was another version on offer. This third 
version of nationalism emphasised commitment to the politics of self-
determination, articulated by more radical Yes supporters, particularly 
through the Radical Independence Campaign (RIC); a view which also 
appealed to a wide variety of campaigners in a broad coalition of radical 
grassroots movements for independence.  
In the following sections these versions of nationalism are outlined 




The UK version of nationalism was understood in terms of a ‘family’ of 
nations that had grown together over the centuries; there might be 
differences within the family but the answer was not divorce through 
Scottish independence. The 1707 Act of Union, between the crowns of 
England and Scotland, had not only brought an end to wars between the two 
countries it also enabled both to prosper for over 300 years. The Act of 
Union was a political arrangement which permitted the civic institutions of 
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Scotland and the Scottish church a large degree of autonomy and freedom 
from central state control (Paterson, 2003). Hence the UK had evolved into 
the ‘natural’ territorial and political unit in contrast, for example, with how 
relations to Europe and the European Union had developed. Advocating the 
maintenance of this ‘natural’ political unit did not entail any sense of 
essentialism or exceptionalism often associated with nationalism. It was 
simply the accepted ‘common sense’ (in the Gramscian sense of the 
universalization of a particular set of interests, see Gramsci, 1980), that the 
UK was normal and that anything which questioned it – Scottish 
independence – was narrowly and regressively nationalistic in contrast. As 
Foley and Remand remark, “Nationalism is a product of the UK fringes, 
Westminster politics, by an implicit contrast, is either neutral in respect to 
nationhood, or somehow ‘internationalist’” (2014, p. 39).  
Discursive constructs which are invisible are also extremely powerful 
influences on thinking and acting. The erasure of UK nationalism from the 
referendum debate skewed the case against Scottish nationalism as being 
self-interested and narrowly focussed, whereas the Unionist position was 
not. By appearing to be ‘non-nationalistic’, or even internationalist, the 
Unionist position could assume the moral high ground of having wider 
concerns without needing to justify itself. What was remarkable about this 
was, in parallel to opposing Scottish independence, the UK Conservative 
Party also made commitments to a referendum on leaving Europe to limit 
incursions into its electoral support from the right-wing United Kingdom 
Independence Party (UKIP). It was therefore simultaneously arguing against 
Scottish independence whilst making arguments for a referendum on 
withdrawal from the European Union with particular emphasis on reducing 
migration to the UK (see Hassan 2013). Undermining UK sovereignty (The 
European Union) or UK borders (Scottish independence) was therefore 
reducing the capacity of the state to act in the best interests of all UK 
citizens. The implicit claim of the state’s neutrality in relation to its role in 
supporting all its citizens meant UK nationalism did not need debating; it 
was the default starting position that was simply given and above discussion. 
The fact that the Unionist position was never labelled pejoratively as 
nationalistic, whereas arguments for independence were branded that way, 
was also aided by the broad front of their campaign. The Conservatives, 
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Labour and Liberal Democrats kept a remarkably united front on this issue 
until after the result: they then fell out immediately. At the same time, the 
leadership of the campaign group was firmly Scottish rather than English, 
Labour Party rather than Conservative or Liberal. Directing the Better 
Together (Unionist) campaign was a former Scottish Labour Party 
Chancellor of the Exchequer, along with the leader of the Scottish Labour 
Party, with minor supporting roles from the leaders of the Scottish Liberal 
Democrats and Scottish Conservative Party. One advantage of the Labour 
Party leading the campaign was that the party had an electoral base in 
Scotland and had some (even if in decline) credibility to argue on issues of 
social justice in the UK context. This would help reinforce the claim that 
Scottish nationalism was narrowly self-interested whereas the Unionist camp 
was concerned with equity across the UK.  
 
SNP’s Civic Nationalism 
 
The Associate Director of the University of Edinburgh’s Centre for 
Constitutional Change, Nicola McEwen (2014), argues that there were three 
main themes in the SNP version of national independence: firstly, the 
democratic case for arguing that Scotland should be governed by the 
government it elects. The fact that a UK Conservative coalition government 
was in power in the UK, but Scotland had elected only one Conservative 
Member of Parliament, underlines the point. Secondly, there was an 
economic argument: controlling all the economic levers would enable the 
Scottish government to take the best decisions for Scotland. Thirdly, the 
SNP argued that independence would enable the government to make fairer 
decisions more in tune with Scottish values. What is surprising, but highly 
significant, is that the SNP played down any sense of a particular need for 
independence based on ethnicity or cultural distinctiveness. 
The SNP’s version of ‘civic nationalism’ argued that as long as a person 
lived in Scotland and fulfilled a residency requirement they were entitled to 
vote on Scotland’s future; residency was a proxy for active commitment to 
Scotland, more so than birth right or ancestry. Thus many Scots living in 
other parts or the UK or abroad were ineligible to vote whereas migrants 
residing in Scotland were eligible. Another aspect of this civic nationalism 
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was in relation to migration. Instead of presenting migration as a critical 
problem – which was the dominant discourse in UK politics - the SNP’s 
position was to present it as part of the solution to future, sustainable, 
economic growth by encouraging the talented and educated to come and live 
in Scotland. Support for migration would be a counterweight to the 
demographics of an ageing and declining Scottish population. The 
qualifications bar on entry did not mean a completely open migration policy. 
Nevertheless, it is worth emphasising that whilst this promotion of migration 
to Scotland was indicative of its civic nationalism the UK Government was 
taking the opposite, hostile, response to migrants from Europe and 
elsewhere.  
What independence meant, through the SNP’s lens of civic nationalism, 
was less than clear. Macwhirter (2013) has characterised it as ‘independence 
within the UK’. The SNP’s preference was to keep in the sterling zone 
which was controlled by the Bank of England based in London rather than 
Edinburgh; to retain the Crown as the Head of State thus maintaining a 
system of allegiance albeit as subjects rather than citizens of the state; in 
relation to security it wanted to continue membership of NATO (a nuclear 
alliance) whilst removing nuclear weapons from Scotland; and on the 
European Union it preferred to remain in – or if necessary, rejoin it. Of 
course all of these preferences amounted to interdependence, rather than 
independence, with the former requiring agreement with other interested 
parties which were not necessarily going to acquiesce (e.g. all the main UK 
political parties made it clear that they would not allow an independent 
Scottish Government to share sterling). In addition, the SNP stressed the 
importance of the social union with the rest of the UK, through family and 
friendship connections, that would continue despite constitutional change 
and new borders. The paradox of this was that emptying independence of 
substantive meaning might make it attractive (because it would seem 
painless and not such a big change) as well as pointless (the goal might not 










The third version of nationalism was of a more radical social and political 
kind, which is often associated with anti-colonial history against imperial 
domination. Arguably, Scotland had been colonised by the English but they 
had also been very active partners in the colonisation of other countries and 
had benefitted from the spoils of the British Empire. Over 300 years of 
union had brought its benefits to Scots which is why it had stood the test of 
time.  However, these had become less obvious as the social democratic fix 
in UK politics unravelled from the late 1970s onwards, first under successive 
Thatcherite governments, then through New Labour in the late 1990s and 
more recently through the UK Coalition Government. The dominance of 
neoliberal politics which promoted the virtues of inequality, whilst also 
withdrawing the social arm of the welfare state as poverty rose, was being 
promoted by governments that the Scots had rejected in UK national 
elections. In this context, the meaning of independence emphasised the 
vocabulary of self-determination because its key themes were not about the 
nation, or its people as such, but about values of equality, political autonomy 
and social justice, achieved through deep-rooted structural change in society. 
Self-determination had two interrelated democratic aims: firstly, to challenge 
control from above by transforming constitutional arrangements; and 
secondly, to transform patterns of relations horizontally to address poverty, 
inequality and social injustices in communities. 
In this radical discourse, redrawing the constitutional boundaries of the 
nation was a means to an end; independence was not the end itself. In this 
vision, it is the democratic life of society that has to be revitalised if formal 
political institutions and procedures are going to be meaningful, and related 
to Scotland’s social and economic problems. This is clear in RIC’s post-
referendum People’s Vow agreed at its national conference in November 
2014. This includes: 
 The People’s budget – mapping the alternative to austerity 
 Ending fracking 
 Land for all – put the country’s natural resources in the hands of 
the people 
 Equality not as an afterthought 
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 Democracy before profit – work with other forces across 
Europe and the US to stop the Transatlantic Trade and Investment 
Partnership. 
 
The main purpose of independence, from this perspective, is to resist 
neoliberalism by providing alternative arguments and values for policy and 
politics. In the current context, where the independence route for change has 
been closed down, the focus of community campaigning has shifted to these 
substantive issues. Instead of being inward looking, a hallmark of 
nationalism, the radical independence campaign was intent to ‘light a 
beacon’ which would influence radical movements in the rest of the UK, by 
demonstrating alternatives to the neoliberal orthodoxy and ‘common sense’ 
promoted by mainstream UK political parties. In this sense, the radical 
campaign for independence was more about the nation as a context for 
political hope.  
To summarise, the UK version of nationalism was simply the ‘back 
story’, it seldom became the ‘front story’ but, if it did, it was as a benign and 
neutral construct. The SNP version of nationalism can be characterised as 
transferring more substantial powers from the UK to the Scottish Parliament 
so that independence involved substantial freedom from Westminster (but 
not entirely) at the same time seeking interdependence with other political, 
European and international institutions. The radical version of self-
determination might be seen as transferring power from political institutions 
to Scottish people so that independence meant freedom from the shackles of 
neoliberal politics and policies along with the structures, institutions and 
processes that protected them. 
 
The ‘Curriculum’ of the Mainstream Media 
 
The mainstream media are important sources of ideas, information and 
learning although their selectivity makes them powerful tools for limiting 
public debate and narrowing the terms of discussion. As the campaigning 
journalist Monbiot points out, ‘Despite the rise of social media, the 
established media continues to define the scope of representative politics in 
Britain, to shape political demands and to punish and erase those who resist’ 
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(Monbiot 2014). During the campaign the print media and broadcast media 
were overwhelmingly pro-Union. In terms of print media all UK and 
Scottish national daily newspapers were against independence except one 
Scottish Sunday national paper (The Sunday Herald). Although there was a 
wide range of individual journalists, critics, academics, actors, poets, 
playwrights, singers and songwriters who had a public profile and were able 
to open up spaces for dissent in the mainstream media, the chorus of support 
for the Union was uniform across the popular and quality press. With this 
type of stranglehold on public discourse there was little likelihood of the 
merits of the independence position receiving credible representation.  
Researchers from the University of the West of Scotland provide the only 
published systematic evidence of the role of the broadcast media’s 
newsroom representation of the campaign (at the time of writing). This 
research is based on a content analysis of output over one year of the 
campaign between September 2012 and September 2013. The evidence is 
damning about bias in the main BBC television broadcasts during this 
period. Anti-independence statements and broadcasts were numerically 
greater and often ended on alleged economic insecurities of independence 
through price rises, factory closures, poorer local services and so on. 
Distortions also occurred in less obvious ways: presenting evidence as 
coming from impartial sources when they were not, along with the 
personalisation and demonization of the SNP leader (see Robertson 2014). 
Indeed, there was even an attempt by the BBC to muzzle the academic 
leading this research who was fortunately supported by his university.  The 
interlocking of the dominant political elite and the mass media outlets meant 
that impartial treatment of claims for independence were harder to come by. 
Of course there were some sympathetic and insightful accounts of the 
referendum issues, such as MacWhirter’s (2013) three-part Road to 
Referendum series which was broadcast and even some popular programmes 
that were open-ended. For example, the well known UK celebrity and 
entrepreneur, Janet Street Porter, was broadcast as she walked across 
Scotland and talked to people about their views on independence. Her 
starting assumption was that the Scots hated the English for some baffling 
reason and it was this dislike that motivated them to entertain constitutional 
separation. To her credit she concluded that the situation was far more 
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complex and, surprisingly, the Scots did not hate the English. The link 
between ‘hate the English’ and the SNP’s Scottish nationalism was, 
however, a common theme in media discourse even if it had little basis in 
reality. Whilst there might be some anti-Englishness in Scotland, if anything 
racist incidents against ‘white English’ had declined in recent years from a 
low level (Macwhirter 2013, p32) 
The association of independence with anti-Englishness played to an 
ethnic version of nationalism and muddied the waters on the more complex 
issues at hand whilst, at the same time, tuning the populist discourse into 
making links between nationalism and politically regressive politics. All 
supporters of independence were guilty by association with this position, 
despite the fact that the SNP view on nationalism was quite different from 
this and there were other versions of independence available. The radical 
version was completely ignored or dismissed as if it did not exist.  
Against all these odds the fact that 45% of the electorate voted for 
independence was something of an achievement. However, the SNP case 
was unconvincing in the end, in part because it claimed independence would 
enable it to serve the goal of social justice better but it failed to make a 
convincing case for redistribution of wealth within Scotland (it was mute on 
issues of progressive income tax and only made the case for redistribution in 
national terms), whilst at the same time offering large tax cuts for 
corporations. In contrast, the radical case for self-determination posed the 
problem of social justice in terms of structural inequalities which could only 
be solved through significant attempts to change society at its roots. 
However this case did not get a hearing inside the mainstream media – its 
message was primarily through social media and community level 
campaigns – so it failed to become part of the public discourse of the 
referendum. 
Even had the radical version of independence been able to convey its 
case to a wider audience it is unlikely to have made a decisive difference to 
the result. The SNP strategy of advocating constitutional change, but making 
it seem simple, did have a sound logic to it because it was presented as 
manageable and painless. However, it was not enough to counteract the 
powerful message of Project Fear, which the Better Together campaign was 
called. Fear of the unknown, fear of pension cuts, fear of the problems of a 
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currency crisis, fear of security in a nuclear free Scotland, fear of an 
economy not big enough to pay its way and so on was a powerful, 
systematic and overwhelming message. To challenge this would require a 
mass level of political consciousness that practical alternatives were possible 
and that action had to be based on resolute political principle. In other words 
this needed a politicised electorate with high levels of commitment to social 
and political struggle. 
 
The Result of the Campaign 
 
The independence vote was lost but there was still a significant victory in 
terms of changing attitudes towards the status quo. The Yes vote grew in 
support from a low of around 25% in 2013 to 45% by September 2014. 
Equally remarkable was the shift in the motivation for rejecting 
independence. In 2013 of those who wanted no change, 43% held that view 
regardless of offers to give Scotland more devolved powers. By the time of 
the referendum, this figure had dropped to only 28%. In other words, 72% of 
those voting against independence were also voting for changes to increase 
legislative power to Scotland’s Parliament. The status quo was no longer an 
option.  
The leaders of the UK political parties all recognised this demand for 
change particularly as, two weeks prior to the vote, two opinion polls gave 
the independence campaign a narrow lead. This galvanised action as 
political ‘heavyweights’ (e.g. Gordon Brown, the former Prime Minister of 
the UK and a Scot) effectively replaced the Better Together leadership and 
made promises for Scotland’s future if it stayed in the UK whilst, on the 
other hand, a swathe of corporate interests were mobilised to warn Scots 
about the inevitable price hikes facing consumers in an independent country. 
To reinforce support for the UK, a national advert presented a Vow, signed 
by the political leaders of the main UK parties, to introduce further 
devolution for the Scottish Parliament if Scotland stayed within the UK, and 
this was widely publicised.  
In this flurry of ‘carrots and sticks’ to the Scottish electorate it is 
surprising that so many were still willing to leave one of the richest political 
nations in the world. There were other remarkable features of the process: 
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96% of the electorate registered to vote and 84% of these voted on the day, 
which was the largest turnout in a UK election since the extension of the 
franchise in the early 20
th
 century. To put it in context, in the 2011 Scottish 
Parliamentary elections only 50.4% of the electorate voted and in 2012 
Local Government elections the turnout was a dismal 39.5%. So something 
important had happened in the democratic process: the election outcome 
mattered to people and there was a meaningful choice to make. 
The analysis of people’s voting pattern does not have a simple message. 
The demographics of the vote are as follows: the over 55 age group were 
more likely to oppose independence, rising steeply with the over 65s, with 
75% of this group taking this view. Women were slightly more predisposed 
to vote for the Union than men. The under-40s were more likely to support 
independence particularly the 25-34 year olds. There is some evidence that 
the majority of 16-17 year olds voted for independence, but this is by no 
means clear or uncontested
2
. There was also the degree to which the vote 
was ‘classed’, in the sense that working class areas of the country voting for 
independence and middle class areas voting against it - but the relationship 
was not simple or uncontradictory. The largest city in Scotland, Glasgow, 
was for independence (55% Yes), as was the fourth largest city Dundee 
(57% Yes), both of which are characterised as working class cities. However 
in all other areas across Scotland the Union vote won even in poor and 
disadvantaged areas. It also had a strong regional and rural dimension. The 
North East and North West of Scotland (traditional heartlands of the SNP) 
along with the Border region to the South and the South West rejected 
independence. Meanwhile the capital city Edinburgh was decisively No 
(61%).  
If we look at the figures through a different lens, the social class 
complexity of the voting pattern is confirmed. If occupational classification 
is taken as a proxy for social class the higher managerial and professional 
occupational categories voted Yes 40% and No 60%. The intermediate 
occupational categories voted Yes 49% and No 51%, but there were 
significant divisions in the traditional manual working class categories. The 
skilled working class occupational groups were marginally pro-
independence whereas lower working class manual occupations were 
decisively pro-Union (see Hassan, 2014, p3). 




Not Independence but Widespread Politicisation 
 
Our concern for our private affairs is balanced by our involvement 
with the affairs of the city. Even people who are mostly occupied with 
their own business are extremely well informed on political matters. 
We do not simply regard a man who does not participate in the city’s 
life as one who just minds his own business, but as one who is good 
for nothing. We all join in debate about the affairs of the city, as they 
deserve, or at least we participate in the decisions. We do not think 
that these discussions impede action. We do believe that what is 
damaging is to go into action in a crucial situation before the people 
have been fully instructed in debate. (Pericles 431/30 B.C.) 
 
Pericles’ funeral oration might be a long way from Scotland in time and 
space but I suspect that, had he been in Scotland, he might have seen 
something familiar. His comments are a remarkable reminder that the 
wellbeing of democracy has to be measured in terms of the degree to which 
public participation in the decisions and affairs of the state is regarded as 
normal and expected. One of the more significant factors in the referendum 
experience is that it has produced widespread politicisation of the electorate 
to a degree which was unimaginable and unforeseen. The democracy that 
currently exists in the UK depends a great deal on public apathy with 
mainstream politics, along with the warping of political discourse through a 
narrowly controlled media. There are now significant threats to this, which 
the referendum process has enhanced. 
Firstly, the referendum has generated what might be termed a politicised 
learning society. What I mean by this is that it encouraged widespread 
debate, discussion and argument about the political choices open to people in 
a way that moved people to act, to think politically and to take an interest in 
the politics of the state as well as in civic and community life. It happened 
across all types of people and was not confined to a narrow, educated, 
already politically engaged class. One outcome of this has been a massive 
increase in party political membership. The SNP was the main political 
beneficiary with membership trebling to over 96,000, so that it is now the 
third largest political party in the UK, whereas the Scottish population is 
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only one tenth of the country. All the political parties which supported 
independence have experienced remarkable increases in membership. The 
youth wing of the Scottish Green Party is now bigger than the whole of the 
party before the referendum; the Scottish Socialist Party has also reported 
surges in membership. This politicisation has extended downwards to young 
people too. Recent evidence suggests around 25% of 16-17 year olds have 
joined a political party with a similar number being involved in political 
campaigning after the referendum (Black, 2015). 
Attendance at political events has been phenomenal. The Annual 
Convention of the SNP in November 2014 attracted 12,000 members and, on 
the same weekend in Glasgow, 3,000 participants attended the RIC Annual 
Conference, which was fully booked at least three weeks before the event. 
The opposite seems to be occurring in the main political party supporting the 
union position – membership of the Scottish Labour Party is in deep decline 
although the party refuses to publicise figures. At the UK General Election 
in May 2015, the opinion polls predict a meltdown in Scottish Labour’s 
electoral support (Clark and Carrell, 2015). Even if this does not happen as 
dramatically as expected there is no doubt that the Scottish Labour Party’s 
membership and electoral base has suffered heavily. The Scottish Liberal 
Democrats and Scottish Conservative Party have small membership bases so 
are unlikely to experience much obvious decline because of their limited 
starting position. 
Another indicator of engagement with the politics of the state was the 
response to the Smith Commission, which was set up in the wake of the 
referendum to formulate how the Vow proposed by the three main UK 
political parties for further devolved powers to Scotland would be focussed. 
What is interesting is that the public was invited to send in their responses 
along with the political parties who were represented on the commission. 
Over 14,000 individual replies were received. In total some 18,000 
responses were generated. 
Secondly, there is strong evidence of the growth of what might be termed 
as ‘politicised autodidacts’ using social media, the Internet and email 
amongst other digital tools to circulate information, write blogs, research 
different views, to acquire critical accounts of mainstream political topics, in 
short, to think politically. This process of self-education has a chain reaction 
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as people discuss and argue with their friends, families and wider contacts 
sometimes through personal social media sites but also in digital public 
spaces through blogs and online communal sites. The National Library of 
Scotland set out to document the referendum and has tracked over 750 
publically accessible web sites which were devoted to it. A number of web 
sites became the focal point for independence campaigners, such as Wings 
Over Scotland, Bella Caledonia, National Collective, along with others 
which produced daily updates, distributed information of a polemical, 
opinionated nature and brought into the debate a wide range of issues for 
readers to comment on and write about as well as providing biting, satirical, 
ironic images and parodies which contributed creatively and critically to the 
debate. 
A further example of the significance of social media is related to the 
traffic on Facebook referencing the referendum. In the five weeks before the 
vote there were over 10 million exchanges and 85% of these were generated 
in Scotland. Facebook research indicates that 2.05 million interactions were 
directly related to the Yes campaign and 1.96 million were about Better 
Together (BBC News 16
th
 September, 2014). What is striking also about 
these exchanges is the degree to which personal Facebook sites and political 
messages are reducing the space between the personal and the political. 
Social media can seem to have a narcisstic dimension as users present 
images of themselves to friends or, it can simply be a social medium for 
sharing information and items of interest. During the referendum the gap 
between personal and political interests changed as Facebook users regularly 
used their own personal sites to exchange information, articles and ideas on 
the politics of the referendum. 
Thirdly, what the referendum did was remove the hold political parties, 
political elites and mass media ‘opinion leaders’ have on politics which, in 
most cases, simply reinforce patterns of authority on political issues (see 
Jones 2014). Discussion, debate, and conversation on the issues of 
independence were an everyday experience during the referendum period, at 
work, at home, travelling, in shops, on buses, in restaurants, in personal 
social media messages, at the theatre, cinema and of course in pubs and 
almost anywhere people could meet: deliberation on the issue was 
widespread and engaging. Some of this activity may have generated more 
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heat than light but what cannot be ignored was the fact that a public culture 
of debating politics was underway to an extent that was inconceivable at the 
start of the campaign. This was true for both Yes and No positions. It needs 
to be stressed that, as stated earlier, the status quo was no longer an option 
by the time of the vote. In particular, in the final few months, which reached 
a crescendo in the weeks before the election, with the news that the 
independence campaign had a narrow lead, the level of public engagement 
with the referendum was intoxicating.  
To document the above in December 2014 I decided to undertake an 
online survey of people’s learning experiences during the referendum. The 
plan was simple. Send out an online survey to a handful of friends and 
students and ask them to complete and pass on if they thought it was useful. 
Within two days I had 350 completed replies, a few days later over a 1,000 
and within a week 1355, when I closed the survey. I recount this process 
because the response was phenomenal and beyond my wildest expectations 
(the results are still being analysed so are not reported here). I believe the 
survey ‘hit the spot’ in terms of connecting to the desire of people to 
continue discussing the referendum experience. I had experienced that 
myself and had attended public meetings, after the result, where the same 
sense of public interest and ‘loss’ seemed to be experienced. The loss was 
not about the result of the vote as much as it was about being engaged with 
the political process. 
Although the mainstream political parties and opinion leaders dominated 
the mass media spaces of the referendum campaign they could not, and 
cannot, dominate the everyday places in which people discuss, argue and 
debate with friends, with families, colleagues, at shopping checkouts, at the 
hairdressers, on Facebook sites, with strangers at the bus stop, on ferry 
crossings and so on. These unregulated spaces are resourced through ideas, 
information and experience often outside of the control of the political 
classes. In Gramscian terms, civil society is the site of hegemony in the 
sense of mediating ideas and experiences which construct ‘common sense’. 
That is, a common sense which is shaped in the interests of powerful groups 
and serves to reinforce patterns of power, privilege and authority in society; 
it is socially and politically crafted, not natural or neutral. Because civil 
society is relatively free from state control it can be a powerful means of 
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exerting this consent without appearing to raise a hand to do so. Equally it 
can be extremely vulnerable. Free from direct regulation, the unpredictable 
can happen in civil society and new ideas and experiences, which challenge 
the politics of common sense, begin to unravel the dominant hegemony. 




Returning to the defining moment where the article started, the issue of 
personal and collective responsibility has now entered mainstream politics in 
Scotland as the mass infusion of independence campaigners have 
reenergised the political parties which lost the vote. The act of collectively 
giving witnessed in George Square is today echoed in the act of collective 
political thinking. Of course nothing is guaranteed and there will, no doubt, 
be attempts to marginalise active public participation in politics. However, 
the initial evidence indicates that the type of political commitment and 
energy witnessed during the referendum is percolating into civic and 
community life, into social movements for change, as well as political 
parties. The process of politicisation is moving from the cultural politics of 
communities into the political culture of the Scottish state. This is in marked 
contrast to current trends across the politics of Europe. According to the 
Economist Intelligence Unit (Wooldridge, 2015) there is “a gaping hole at 
the heart of European politics where big ideas should be” which is reflected 
in flight from the mainstream political groups. The UK is currently at the 
unenviable head of this trend. But this can no longer apply to Scotland. So 
where will the ‘big ideas’ come from? Certainly not from the elite or the 
corporate and political sector with their ‘think tanks’ that have a vested 
interest in controlling and limiting ideas which potentially threaten their 
power. In the end the big ideas can only come from ‘below’ as people seek 
to find ways to make their lives better and more meaningful; this is the place 
where the energy, criticality and creative ideas for change can grow and be 
nurtured. It requires a politicised society, with an electorate prepared to act 
resolutely on principle, which is the necessary foundation for counter-
hegemonic change. Scotland in this respect might still prove to be the threat 
of a good example. 





1 Food banks as a way of supporting people in need have grown phenomenally during the 
period of political austerity as a community response to poverty. For further information see 
http://www.trusselltrust.org/ 
2 One exit opinion poll suggested that 16-17 year olds had voted massively in favour of 
independence  (71%) but only had a small sample. Another exit poll suggests a small margin 
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